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ESSAY
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW RESTATED
DAVID OWEN*
For most of the late twentieth century, section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, the fountainhead of modem products liability law, ruled
supreme. With approval by the American Law Institute' of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liabili in May 1997, section 402A ofthe SecondRestatement
was effectively repealed In its place now sits an entire new Restatement dedicated
solely to the topic of products liability law.4 This essay briefly traces the history of
* Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, and Editorial Adviser,
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. This essay is adapted from a paper delivered at a
conference in London, England, held on September 23, 1997 by Nottingham Law School and the
University of Sheffield. The European Journal of Consumer Law plans to publish a European version
of the paper. Thanks to James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, Reporters for the Products Liability
Restatement, Elena Cappella and Michael Greenwald, Deputy Directors ofthe American Law Institute,
and Jerry Phillips, a member of the Consultative Group for the Restatement, for their comments on
earlier versions of this paper, and to Sarah Berry and Anne Kearse for their editorial assistance. Not
a member of the ALI, Pat Hubbard did not participate in the new Restatement project.
1. The American Law Institute (the "ALL" or "Institute") was formed in 1923 to clarify,
simplify, and improve the common law of this nation. See generally William Draper Lewis, How We
Did It, in ALI, RESTATEMENT IN THE CoURTs: HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE AND THE
FIRSTRESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 1 (perm. ed. 1945). With an elected membership of somewhat more
than 3,000 of the nation's nearly one million practicing lawyers, judges, and law professors, the ALI's
"Restatements" of various fields of law command broad i'espect. For commentary on the Restatement
process, see The Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin
and the American Law Institute, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1, 17 n.60 (citing N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and
Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAw & HIsT. REv. 55,
60-65 (1990)); Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REv. 582, 591-92 (1935); Hans Linde,
Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 821, 840, 844
(1994); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law ofProducts Liability: The ALIRestatement Project,
48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995); Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of
Policy in the Restatement Work oftheAmerican Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis U. L.J. 185 (1968).
2. In conformity with its standard practice, the ALI entitled the new Restatement the
Restatement ofthe Law Third, Torts: Products Liability. Note, however, that the full citation form for
the Restatement used in this paper generally follows the uniform Bluebook citation form. Assuming
that the new Restatement is published on schedule in 1998, its uniform Bluebook citation form will
be, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e, illus. 5 (1998)
[hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT]. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION § 12.8.5, at 85 (16th ed. 1996).
3. The development of the Second Restatement of Torts section 402A, is briefly chronicled in
Part I.C, below.
4. At its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., on May 20, 1997, the ALI membership voted to
adopt the ProposedFinalDraft of the Products Liability Restatement, subject to editorial revision and
1
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the law of products liability, describes the process by which the law in this area
was "restated" by the American Law Institute, outlines the structure of the new
Restatement, and describes the basic liability tests and various limitations on
liability for defects in manufacture, design, and warnings as set forth in the new
Restatement.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
.4. Negligence Actions
The history of the law of products liability is conveniently traced to
Winterbottom v. Wright,' the 1842 English decision which established the principle
that a person injured by a defective chattel could not maintain a negligence action
against the chattel's supplier in the absence of privity of contract. As the Industrial
Revolution rolled across the American continent, the various states embraced the
rule of Winterbottom, limiting negligence liability for selling defective products
with an enthusiasm reflecting the new nation's individualistic spirit and its desire
to protect its infant industry. In products liability negligence actions, the privity
doctrine reigned throughout this nation until 1916 when Judge Benjamin Cardozo
handed down the landmark decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6 Involving
a claim against a remote manufacturer for a defect in a car, MacPherson repudiated
the privity bar to actions brought in negligence by injured persons with no direct
contractual dealings with defendant manufacturers.' As the MacPherson holding
spread across the nation during the first half of the twentieth century, negligence
doctrine opened up as the primary basis of liability for products liability claims.8
amendments debated and approved at the May 20 meeting.
5. 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403-04 (Ex. 1842).
6. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
7. Judge Cardozo reasoned:
Beyond all question, the nature of an automobile gives warning of probable
danger if its construction is defective. This automobile was designed to go 50
miles an hour. Unless its wheels were sound and strong, injury was almost
certain. It was as much a thing of danger as a defective engine for a railroad.
The defendant knew the danger. It knew also that the car would be used by
persons other than the buyer.... The dealer was indeed the one person of whom
it might be said with some approach to certainty that by him the car would not
be used. Yet the defendant would have us say that he was the one person whom
It was under a legal duty to protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent
a conclusion. Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit
the conditions of travel to-day.
Id. at 1053.
8. It took some time for the MacPherson doctrine to take root. Lingering on in some states
longer than others, the privity bar to negligence actions was not finally repudiated in the last state,
Maine, until 1982. See Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 938-39 (Me. 1982).
[Vol. 49:273
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B. Warranty Actions
Early products liability law developed to a large extent through the law of
warranty.' Even today warranty law plays a significant, if secondary, role in
defining this field of law." During the first half of the nineteenth century, the
doctrine of caveat emptor dominated sales law in the United States, except in South
Carolina which had always embraced the contrary doctrine of caveat venditor."
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, a number of state courts began to
reverse the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of goods by judicially implying a
warranty of quality ("merchantability") into most such sales. After the turn of the
twentieth century, following the example of Great Britain, 2 thirty-seven American
jurisdictions" eventually codified the law of sales by adopting the Uniform Sales
Act, which provided for an implied warranty of merchantability in certain sales of
goods.'4 With the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code in the late 1950s
and early 1960s,5 the implied warranty of merchantability was legislatively
incorporated into the law of every state.' 6 While liability for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability is undoubtedly a form of strict products liability (in
contract), 7 warranty responsibility is weakened as a consumer protection device by
9. See William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALEL.J. 1099 (1960).
10. This proposition is illustrated emphatically by Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730
(N.Y. 1995), which held that the design of a Ford Bronco II sport utility vehicle which rolled over
could be held to breach the implied warranty of merchantability even though the design was not
"defective" for purposes of strict liability in tort. Id. at 733-35. The practice of including warranty law
under the "products liability" umbrella differs from the practice in England, where the scope of the
"product liability" category excludes the law of warranty. See JANE STAPLErON, PRODUCT LIABILITY
9 (1994) (in England, the "product liability" term commonly refers only to tortious liability).
11. Under the rule of caveat venditor, a sale "raises an implied warranty
(against latent defects) from the fairness and fullness of the price paid, upon this
clear and reasonable ground, that in the contract of sale, the purchaser is not
supposed to part with his money, but in expectation of an adequate advantage,
or recompense." Champreys v. Johnson, [3 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 268, 272 (1809)].
"Selling for a sound price raises an implied warranty that the thing sold is free
from defects, known and unknown (to the seller)."
Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 503, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976) (citation omitted). See
generally DAVID G. OWEN, JoHN E. MONTGOMERY & W. PAGE KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY 21 n.* & 102 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY].
12. See Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71, in RALPH SUt1roN& N.P. SHANNON,
CHALMERS' SALE OF GOODS ACT, 1893, at 1 (12th ed. 1945).
13. This includes thirty-six states and the District of Columbia.
14. Promulgated in 1906, the Uniform Sales Act (predecessor to the Uniform Commercial
Code) provided, in section 15(2), for an implied warranty of merchantability in sales by
description. See UNIF. SALES ACT § 15(2) (superceded by U.C.C. § 2-314 (1962)), 1 U.L.A. 7 (1950).
15. Although the Official Draft of the U.C.C. is dated 1962, several states adopted its
preliminary provisions in the late 1950s.
16. U.C.C. § 2-314.
17. It is "strict" because it is a "no-fault" form of liability by which a seller may innocently
1998]
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various contract-law defenses-notably disclaimers,'" the privity requirement,' 9 and
the buyer's duty to notify the seller promptly of breach." Despite these rather
onerous defenses, however, claimants have pursued many thousands of products
liability claims under Article 2 of the U.C.C., and many such claims have been
successful.2'
C. Strict Liability in Tort
In 1960, Justice Francis of the Supreme Court of New Jersey rendered the
decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.,' an implied warranty of
merchantability case in which the wife of the purchaser of a new automobile was
injured in a collision caused by a defect in the car. Rejecting the manufacturer's
defenses based on the plaintiffs lack of privity and on a contractual disclaimer of
liability, the New Jersey court allowed the plaintiff to maintain her claim.' Three
become subject to liability for breach.
18. U.C.C. § 2-316.
19. U.C.c. § 2-318.
20. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
21. It should be noted that the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws presently are collaborating on a revision of Article 2. Preliminary drafts of the provisions
affecting products liability claims materially alter existing doctrine. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: RFviSED ARTICLE 2. SALES (Discussion Draft, Apr. 14, 1997).
22. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
23. The Henningsen court concluded, with respect to theprivily defense (which had theretofore
been abandoned only in food cases):
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a
bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage may
bring illness to one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm
to the driver, occupants, and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow
barrier of privity.
Id. at 83. In the immortal words of Dean Prosser, Henningsen marked the "fall of the citadel of
privity." William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966).
With respect to the disclaimer defense, the court observed:
Under the law, breach of warranty against defective parts or workmanship
which caused personal injuries would entitle a buyer to damages even if due
care were used in the manufacturing process. Because of the great potential for
harm if the vehicle was defective, that right is the most important and
fundamental one arising from the relationship.... The draftsmanship [of the
disclaimer] is reflective of the care and skill of the Automobile Manufacturers
Association in undertaking to avoid warranty obligations without drawing too
much attention to its effort in that regard.
Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 92-93. Reasoning that "the legislative will has imposed an implied warranty
of merchantability as a general incident of sale of an automobile by description," the court observed
that the disclaimer amounts to "a studied effort to frustrate that protection." Id. at 95. Thus, concluded
the court, "the disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability... [is] violative of public policy
and void." Id. at 97.
[Vol. 49:273
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years later, relying in part on Henningsen, Justice Roger Traynor of the Supreme
Court of California authored Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc.,24 the first
case explicitly to adopt the doctrine of strict liability in tort. By stripping contract-
based defenses from contract-based strict liability claims, reasoned Justice Traynor,
Henningsen and other cases had essentially moved liability from contract law to
tort law. Better to be forthright, opined Justice Traynor, and call the new products
liability doctrine what it was in spirit if not yet in name: "strict liability in tort.
25
When Justice Traynor issued the Greenman decision in 1963, the American
Law Institute was in the midst of revising the tort law Restatement, from the First
Restatement to the Second, and Dean William Prosser of the University of
California, Berkeley, was the Reporter for the project. 26 Relying substantially on
Henningsen and Greenman, Dean Prosser prepared the final draft of section 402A
of the Second Restatement as a broad-based doctrine of strict liability in tort for the
sale of defective products.' Section 402A defined the heart of the liability
standard-"defective condition unreasonably dangerous"-in terms of the
expectations (contemplations) of the ordinary consumer.28 The American Law
Institute endorsed the new principle of strict liability in tort for the sale of defective
products by adopting section 402A in 1964 and promulgating it by formal
publication in 1965.29
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, section 402A's doctrine of strict
products liability in tort for the sale of defective products spread like wildfire from
state to state, as one court after another, and an occasional state legislature,
"adopted" the new doctrine." With the increasing social and govern-mental
24. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en bane).
25. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being." Id. at 900.
26. Dean Prosser may best be known for his tort law treatise, published in tour editions from
1941 through 1971, the year before his death. The treatise has been continued posthumously. W.
PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
27. For a review of section 402A's broadening coverage in successive Tentative Drafts of the
SecondRestatement between 1961 and 1964, seePutman v. Erie City Mfg., 338 F.2d 911,918-19 (5th
Cir. 1964) (Wisdom, J.).
28. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 402Acmt.g(1965) (defining "defective condition"
as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him"); id. cmt. i (defining "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer").
29. See generally Prosser, supra note 23; Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
30. As of 1998, all states except Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Virginia have adopted the doctrine of strict products liability in tort. The most recent adoption was
in Wyoming. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). The legislatures of Maine,
Oregon, and South Carolina each adopted section 402A essentially verbatim. Also adopting some
form of strict products liability by statute were Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Washington. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at 165, 172.
1998]
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conservatism of the 1980s, however, judicial (and legislative) enthusiasm for
section 402A's "pro-consumer" doctrine began to falter. During this time, judicial
and scholarly attention began to shift away from examining why and how the new
products liability doctrine should be expanded toward why and how the doctrine
should be curtailed.3
This new conservatism in products liability law is illustrated, in design defect
cases, by some courts' replacement of the contract-based consumer expectations
test with a cost-benefit ("risk-utility") test based on tort law's principles of
balance.32 In this and other ways, many courts have begun to reconsider how the
liability standards should be defined, and some have questioned whether a doctrine
of "strict" products liability in tort is appropriate at all in certain contexts where
experience suggests that negligence principles may be preferable. So, while nearly
all states still nominally embrace a doctrine of products liability in tort that they
still call "strict,"33 many courts today are reexamining the doctrine's inner nature
and the boundaries that define its outer edge.
II. THE RESTATEMENTPROCESS
With the termination of its overly ambitious "enterprise responsibility" project
in 199l1, the American Law Institute sensibly proceeded instead to restate the law
of torts in more conventional form. Because the sprawling area of tort law had
grown so large and cumbersome, the ALI decided for Restatement purposes to
subdivide the law on this topic into various components. Due to the explosive
expansion of products liability law after the promulgation of section 402A in the
Second Restatement of Torts in 1965, the ALI announced in 1991 that the first of
the new tort law Restatements would be the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. In 1992, two law professors" were appointed Reporters for the
31. As chronicled in Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 683-99 (1992), and David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA.
L. REV. 703, 705-10 (1992) [hereinafter The Fault Pit].
32. See, e.g., Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994) (adopting the risk-
utility standard for design defect cases); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254-56
(Miss. 1993) (same).
33. See supra note 30.
34. Initially entitled "Compensation and Liability for Product and Process Injuries," the
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury Project results were published in 1991 in the form of a
"Reporters' Study" which was never submitted to the ALI membership for approval. See ALI,
REPORTERS' STuDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991). The project was in
various respects a fiasco on which many observers scathingly, perhaps not unfairly, heaped their
scorn. See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters'Study of Enterprise Responsibility for
Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 241 (1993).
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project, and so began the process of converting a single section, section 402A, of
the Second Restatement into an entire Restatement of its own.
Throughout the Products Liability Restatement project, the Reporters regularly
met with and were advised by the ALI Council." The Reporters also periodically
met with and obtained advice from various groups and persons interested in the
Restatement project, including a group of lawyer, judge, and academic Advisers,37
a Consultative Group of interested members of the Institute,38 and various interest
groups representing a wide variety of defense, claimant, academic, and other
interests. Over the course of the project, beginning with Preliminary Draft No. I in
1993, the Institute circulated drafts of various portions of the Restatement for
comment and critique.39 Beginning with Tentative DraftNo. I in 1994, the full ALI
membership4 debated and voted on Tentative Drafts of various provisions at each
of its annualmeetings until the Institute's final debate and adoption of the Proposed
Final Draft in May 1997. Although debates on successive drafts at each of these
four ALI meetings were vigorous and occasionally contentious, the membership's
final vote to adopt the Proposed Final Draft was unanimous.
After the 1997 annual meeting at which the ALI voted to adopt the Proposed
FinalDraft, the Reporters folded in amendatory language from the final meeting,41
and the Restatement as finally revised was reviewed for technical correctness and
stylistic consistency. 4 To assure that the final amendatory revisions remained
faithful to the approval vote of the ALI membership, the final revisions were
36. Roughly sixty prominent lawyers, judges, and law professors comprise the ALI Council.
37. Nineteen lawyers,judges, and law professors comprise the basic Adviser group. In addition,
one law professor, the author, served as Editorial Adviser.
38. Roughly three hundred lawyers, judges, and law professors who are members of the ALI
comprise the Consultative Group.
39. Prior to publication of the final version of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
in 1998, the ALI published a total of twelve drafts of various portions of the work: Preliminary Draft
No. I (April 20, 1993); Council Draft No. 1 (September 17, 1993); Council Draft No. IA (January 4,
1994); Tentative Draft No. 1 (April 12, 1994); Preliminary Draft No. 2 (May 19, 1994); Council
Draft No. 2 (September 2, 1994); Tentative Draft No. 2 (March 13, 1995); Preliminary Draft No. 3
(May 18, 1995); Council Draft No. 3 (November 15, 1995); Tentative Draft No. 3 (April 5, 1996);
Proposed Final Draft (Preliminary Version), Volumes I & II (October 18, 1996); and the Proposed
Final Draft (April 1, 1997).
40. The American Law Institute holds annual meetings in May for the principal purpose of
debating and voting on drafts of Institute projects, including the various Restatements of the Law.
Several hundred members attended the annual meetings from 1994 through 1997 at which the
Products Liability Restatement drafts were considered by the Institute, and, typically, some 200 to
300 members were present and voting on issues put to the membership. The Institute each year
publishes an edited transcript of the annual meeting proceedings.
41. During final debate on the Products Liability Restatement at the 1997 annual ALI meeting,
the Proposed Final Draft was amended in various relatively minor respects. Some amendments were
by formal vote while others were directed by the Director or agreed to by the Reporters to resolve
problematic phraseology, mostly in the comments.
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reviewed by several designated members of the Institute. The Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability is scheduled for publication in mid-1 998.
III. THE RESTATEMENT STRUCTURE
The Products Liability Restatement is divided into four broad chapters, some
of which are further divided into sub-topics, for a total of twenty-one black-letter
sections. The centerpiece of this new Restatement is Chapter 1, Topic 1, entitled
"Liability Rules Applicable to Products Generally," which delineates the basic
liability standards and methods of proof. The first two sections within Topic 1
concern the basic principles of liability, based on the concept of defectiveness, that
apply to products generally. Section 3 describes a circumstantial evidence doctrine,
akin to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, for establishing defectiveness where the
manner in which the accident occurred renders it likely that the accident was
caused by a product defect. Section 4, the final section in Topic 1, describes the
effect of a product's violation of or compliance with governmental standards of
product safety.
Sections 5 through 8 set forth principles governing the liability of sellers of
particular types of products: component parts, prescription drugs, food, and used
products. Sections 9 through 14 address other special duty issues: misrepresenta-
tion, post-sale duties to warn and recall, and responsibilities of successor
enterprises. Sections 15 through 18 address causation issues and affirmative
defenses based on user misconduct and contractual disclaimers. The final sections,
19 through 21, define "product," "seller," and "harm."
Sections 1, 2, and 3 define the fundamental rules of defectiveness theory and
proof applicable to most products liability cases.43 Grounding the Restatement,
section 1 provides the overarching general principle of modem products liability
law-that commercial enterprises are liable for harm caused by defects in products
that they sell:
§ 1. Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by
Defective Products
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability
for harm to persons or property caused by the defect."
Basing liability on whether a product is "defective," section 1 is bound together
with section 2, which defines the three ways in which a defect may occur:
43. The great bulk of products liability law is loaded into the official Comments and Reporters'
Notes to these three initial sections, particularly section 2.
44. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 1.
[Vol. 49:273
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§ 2. Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its
intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product;.
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.4"
The three liability standards in section 2 provide the foundation for most modem
products liability law. 6
Finally, section 3 provides a default method for establishing defectiveness,
useful primarily when the specific kind of proof contemplated by the section 2
definitions has been destroyed in the accident or is otherwise practicably
unavailable. In such cases, proof of defect under section 3 is allowed when the
very circumstances of the accident themselves suggest, more probably than not,
that the accident was caused by a product defect rather than something else:
§ 3. Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference of Product Defect
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused
by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without
proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect;
and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other
than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.47
45. Id. § 2.
46. The Comments to section 2 canvass most of the central issues in products liability law, and
the Reporters' Note provides a wealth of case, statutory, and secondary authority on these issues.
47. PRODUCTS LABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 3.
1998]
9
Owen: Products Liability Law Restated
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Section 3, roughly adapted from the res ipsa loquitur provision of the Second
Restatement of Torts,4" might fairly be termed a principle of defect ipsa loquitur.
This section adopts the so-called "malfunction doctrine" which a small number of
states have explicitly adopted, and which many implicitly apply, to accommodate
problems of proof that sometimes plague plaintiffs when direct evidence of a
specific defect is unavailable.49 While plaintiffs ordinarily must prove their cases
under the section 2 defectiveness provisions, section 3 provides a default
mechanism for establishing liability in special cases where logic and faimess
suggest that a plaintiffs inability to establish a specific defect according to
conventional proof requirements should not preclude the claim.
IV. THE BASIC LIABILITY TESTS
A. Trifurcating Defectiveness
When Dean William Prosser crafted section 402A of the Second Restatement
of Torts in the early 1960s, products liability law was in its infancy."0 At this very
early stage in the development of the law, the defect concept was only roughly
understood and conceived of quite naively as a unitary concept: products were
either too dangerous (defective) or safe enough (nondefective). As courts in the
1960s and 1970s applied the principles of section 402A to an ever-widening array
of products in an ever-widening range of contexts, the disparities among the
various forms of product dangers increasingly revealed themselves. Today, most
courts and commentators accept as axiomatic the fundamental distinctions between
three very different forms of product defect: (1) manufacturing flaws, (2) design
inadequacies, and (3) insufficient warnings of danger and instructions on safe use. ',
During the third of a century since section 402A was adopted by the ALI, the need
to develop different doctrinal approaches to the problems in these three very
different contexts has become a well-accepted premise of products liability law.
Although section 1 of the Products Liability Restatement sets the doctrinal
stage somewhat deceptively, by establishing a single principle of liability for
selling "defective" products, section 2 decisively splinters the notion into the three
separate forms of defect.52 Because the general principle of section 1 is rooted in
48. This section is drawn from section 328D of the SecondRestatement of Torts; see PRODUCTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. a.
49. See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at 53-57.
50. Much of Part IV draws from David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the
"Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 743 [hereinafter Defectiveness Restated], and
David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in the New
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1241 (1994).
51. On the now-conventional nature of this tripartite classification, see PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 1 cmt. a, Reporters' Note.
52. This form of segregation by type of defect continues in various contexts throughout the
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the notion of a "defective product" rather than fault, it might appear simply to
restate the no-fault doctrine of"strict liability" that has dominated products liability
doctrine for the last three decades. However, apart from cases involving manufac-
turing flaws, the language of defectiveness is merely a cloak for a standard of
design and warning "defect" liability that is grounded in fault. Indeed, the primary
reason for trifurcating defectiveness in section 2 is to provide separate vessels for
separate liability standards: subsection 2(a) defines liability for manufacturing
defects in terms that are truly "strict," whereas subsections 2(b) and (c) define
liability for design and warnings defects largely in terms of negligence principles,
notwithstanding the strict-sounding language of "defectiveness" in which the
definitions are cast.53 In short, liability in section 2 of the new Restatement truly is




The new Restatement defines the standard of liability for manufacturing
defects in the strict liability manner of the law of contract.55 Thus, as seen above,
a product is deemed defective in manufacture under section 2(a) "when the product
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the
preparation and marketing of the product."56 Although only a small number of
courts have explicitly used this type of deviation-from-blueprints form of
definition, 7 it is plainly implied by the word "defective" when applied to the
manufacturing flaw context. Not troubling to define the straight-forward notion of
a manufacturing defect, courts probably have simply assumed this kind of
commonsense definition.
The Restatement's standard of liability for manufacturing defects, quite
explicitly stated to be strict, was noncontroversial during the ALI debates on the
Restatement, as in section 6, which separately defines the various duties of sellers of prescription
drugs and medical devices by type of defect.
53. The reasoning behind this move is explained in section 1, comment a. See generally
Defectiveness Restated, supra note 50, at 747-51.
54. Comment a to section 2 provides in part: "The rules set forth in this Section establish
separate standards of liability for manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based on
inadequate instructions or warnings." The comment explains that subsection (a) imposes "[s]trict
liability without fault," and further provides: "Subsections (b) and (c), which impose liability for
products that are defectively designed or sold without adequate warnings or instructions and are thus
not reasonably safe, achieve the same general objectives as does liability predicated on negligence."
It is important to note, however, that a retailer's liability under subsections 2(b) and 2(c), in contrast
to the liability of a manufacturer, is truly strict. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMErr, supra note
2, § I cmt. e and § 2 cmt. o.
55. See Defectiveness Restated, supra note 50, at 750-53.
56. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2(a).
57. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at 245 n.2.
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Restatement and for nearly two decades of debate in Congress over scores of
products liability bills. Because of the special significance of the user's expectation
interests in manufacturing flaw cases, grounded in philosophic principles of equal
freedom,58 contract law's strict-liability principle is plainly proper in this context.
In short, true strict liability in this context is both logical and fair.
C. Design and Warnings Defects
The liability standards for design and warnings (and instructions) defects are
formulated in parallel fashion in section 2, as seen above. Neither liability standard
is stated in traditional strict liability or negligence terms. Instead, both are
formulated in terms of the availability of some "reasonable alternative" design or
warning. The Reporters chose this rather peculiar, "functional" 9 method of
refashioning the basic liability tests because of the schizophrenic nature of design
and warnings liability law which, in doctrine, speaks the language of "strict"
liability but which, in practice, bespeaks the law of negligence.' Products liability
judicial opinions are simply stuck in a no-man's-land somewhere between
negligence and true strict liability.
As a way around this doctrinal dilemma, the Reporters focused on the type of
proof courts require to establish a design or warnings defect case. What their
research revealed, although hotly contested,6' was that courts in these cases
generally require the plaintiffto establish that the defendant reasonably could have
adopted some alternative design or warning that would have prevented the
plaintiffs harm.62 Thus, in both design and warnings cases, liability is defined
functionally in terms of whether the manufacturer reasonably could have provided
58. The policy reasons supporting strict liability in this context are summarized in the Products
Liability Restatement in section 2 comment a. The reasons in moral theory are developed in David G.
Owen, The MoralFoundations ofProducts Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 427, 467-68 (1993) [hereinafter Moral Foundations].
59. The Reporters aptly characterize their definitional approach as "functional," and cite
widespread authority therefor. See section 1 comment a and section 2 comment n, and the Reporters'
Note thereto.
60. See Defectiveness Restated, supra note 50, at 747-51.
61. See, e.g., Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the
Consultative Group, Restatement ofTorts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. Rv. 1173 (1994);
Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable
Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407, 1413-18 (1994); John F. Vargo, The
Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A
Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L.
REv. 493 (1996) (comprehensive survey of the states).
62. For an extended discussion of this point, see the Products Liability Restatement Reporters'
Note to section 2 comment d.
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a safer product. Stripping the rather cumbbrsome Restatement language to its
essentials, the standard of liability under subsections 2(b) and (c) for design and
warnings defects may be translated 3 as follows:
A product is defective if its foreseeable risks of harm could have been
reduced by the adoption of a reasonable altemative design (or warning)
the omission of which renders the product not reasonably safe.
Converted to the active voice, the Restatements liability standard for design and
warnings defects reduces essentially to this:
A product is defective if the seller could have reduced its foreseeable
risks of harm by adopting a reasonable alternative design (or warning) the
omission of which renders the product not reasonably safe.
The requirements of "foreseeability" and "reasonableness" in subsections 2(b)
and 2(c) effectively reconvert the products liability standard for these types of cases
to one of negligence-a rather remarkable retreat from section 402A's explicitly
"strict" standard of liability of the Second Restatement that most courts boldly
purported to apply to design and warnings cases for thirty years. Thus, while
reaffirming the doctrine of strict tort liability for manufacturing defects in
subsection 2(a), subsections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Third Restatement abandon the
strict liability concept and employ negligence principles in design and warning
cases.' This point is clearly made in comment a to section 1:
[The strict liability] rule developed for manufacturing defects is inappro-
priate for [design and warnings claims]. These latt6r categories of cases
require determinations that the product.could have reasonably been made
safer by a better design or instruction or warning.... [The definitions of
defect in these cases] rely on a reasonableness test traditionally used in
determining whether an actor has been negligent.65
Thus, the Products Liability Restatement grounds liability for design and
warnings defects in the reasonableness-balancing-negligence concepts that properly
63. The Restatements liability formulations are linguistically deconstructed in Defectiveness
Restated, supra note 50, at 766-76.
64. Design and warnings claims comprise the bulk of products liability causes of action.
Together, such claims were found to comprise 60% of all claims in one study and 71% in another. In
a study of large claims (in excess of $100,000) in which strict liability was the main theory of
liability, defective design was the theory in 75% of the claims, and warning defects was the theory in
18%. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at 22-24.
65. PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § I cmt. a. See supra note 54.
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dominate the law of tort.1 Particularly in the context of design dangers, most courts
have come to employ a "risk-utility" test for ascertaining whether such dangers
were excessive or acceptable. 7 In most cases, this determination is based upon a
cost-benefit analysis of the manufacturer's choice to forego a safety improvement
that the plaintiff claims was necessary to render the design reasonably safe." This
reasonable-safer-design concept lies at the heart of the new Restatement's definition
of design defectiveness in subsection 2(b).
Consumer expectations remain entitled to important respect in evaluating
design and warning defect claims, but the comments to section 2 unceremoniously
relieve consumer expectations of their elevated status as the test of liability under
section 402A.19 Instead, the new Restatement, following the approach of most
courts, 70 relegates consumer expectations to the balancing calculus. 7' Many
commentators vociferously complained of these definitional changes to the basic
liability tests in subsections 2(b) and (c) (and related comments), fearful that these
provisions in the new Restatement would jettison decades of consumer protection
progress in this area of the law.72 Nevertheless, by shifting from "strict" liability to
negligence principles, the Products Liability Restatement "restates" what most
courts have long been doing if rarely saying.
It long has been an open secret that, while purporting to apply "strict" liability
doctrine to design and warnings cases, courts in fact have been applying principles
that look remarkably like negligence.73 That is, most courts in most contexts have
66. The moral propriety of these principles is explained elsewhere. See David G. Owen,
Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTORT LAW 201
(David G. Owen ed., 1995); The Fault Pit, supra note 31; Moral Foundations, supra note 58.
67. For surveys of how different states define the risk-utility test, see the Products Liability
Restatement Reporters' Note to section 2 comment d (concluding that most courts use risk-utility
test), David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MicH. J. L. REFORM239
(1997) [hereinafter Risk-Utility Balancing] (same), and Vargo, supra note 61 (questioning this
conclusion).
68. How the cost-benefit test is and should be formulated is closely examined in Risk-Utility
Balancing, supra note 67, and David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness:
"Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 TExAs L. REv. 1661 (1997).
69. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
70. But see Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997) (retaining
consumer expectations test in name, but defining it oddly in cost-benefit terms).
71. Risk-utility balancing normally is used only in design cases. See PRODUcTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. f. While it applies somewhat to warnings cases, such cases are
by their nature more fundamentally based on the frustration of expectations. Nevertheless, for a
variety of good reasons, negligence principles properly govern warnings cases, too. See generally
Moral Foundations, supra note 58, at 465-67.
72. See, e.g., Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict Liability
Actions for Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189 (1994); Shapo, supra note I.
73. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Testfor Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND.L.REV. 593, 601 (1930); Mary J. Davis, Design
Defect Liability: In Search ofa Standard ofResponsibility, 39 WAYNEL. REv. 1217, 1238-48(1993);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty
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been basing the defectiveness determination in both design and warnings cases on
the risk-utility principles of balance, reasonableness, and foreseeability. Except in
certain limited instances, the courts have rejected efforts to make manufacturers
guarantors of product safety, requiring only that manufacturers (1) make their
products as safe as they are reasonably able to do, and (2) warn of foreseeably
material risks, by methods that are reasonably available and reasonably likely to be
effective.74 This is negligence, pure and simple, in fact if not in name. Conse-
quently, by grounding liability for design and warnings defects in the principles of
negligence, the newRestatementtruly "restates" the law-no doubt quite differently
from how most courts have stated the law to be, but in fact quite closely to how
most courts functionally have applied the law in litigation.
V. THE BASIC LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
In the jurisprudence of products liability law, the basic limitations on liability
have proved at least as significant, and their contours have been litigated at least as
frequently, as the basic definitions of defectiveness. A review of the law in this
area would be incomplete without at least mentioning four of the most important
boundary issues of products liability law: foreseeability, obvious dangers, product
misuse and alteration, and inherent product dangers.
A. Foreseeability
Whether manufacturers should or should not be responsible in "strict" products
liability for unforeseeable risks is an issue that has long divided courts and
commentators.' Prior to the mid-1980s, most courts and many commentators
assumed that the "strictness" of liability under section 402A precluded a defense
based on the unforeseeability of the risk.76 But two decisions in the mid-1980s, the
Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 277-78 (1990); Defectiveness Restated, supra note
50, at 749; William Powers, Jr.,A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 639. This divergence between illusory strict liability doctrine and actual liability principles
is diagrammatically portrayed in The Fault Pit, supra note 31, at 706.
74. In addition, of course, manufacturers must not misrepresent the safety of their products.
75. This issue variously has been posed in terms of "undiscoverable dangers" or of whether the
discoverability of the risk was within the "state of the art." See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY, supra note II, at 499-547.
76. From the initial adoption of the doctrine of strict products liability in tort during the mid-
1960s, courts routinely made this point. But, in cases where liability was established, negligence or
warranty doctrine typically was sufficient for liability on the facts, for there were usually fairly
simple steps that the manufacturer reasonably could have taken to prevent the harm. The first
noteworthy decision to emphasize and explain the "strictness" of strict tort liability for selling
defective products, on facts where liability turned on the foreseeability of the risk, was Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
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first in New Jersey77 and the second in California,78 boldly renounced the illogic
and unfairness of holding pharmaceutical manufacturers liable for harm they could
neither anticipate nor prevent, and the California court subsequently expanded this
fault-based principle to producers generally.79 In recent years, while an occasional
court still clings tenaciously to the notion that strict liability for defective design
and warnings should not depend upon the foreseeability of the risk,8" most courts
squarely confronting the issue have shielded manufacturers from liability for harm
caused by unforeseeable product risks.81 The new Restatement's explicit limitation
of liability to foreseeable risks of harm in section 2, based on logic and fairness,
thus in fact restates the law applied by most courts.82
B. Obvious Dangers
Courts also hold that manufacturers should be protected, at least to some
extent, from responsibility for accidents attributable to dangers that are obvious.83
Almost all courts agree that manufacturers have no duty to warn of obvious
dangers for the simple reason there is no need to inform people further of dangers
77. Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (restricting Beshada, 447 A.2d 539, an
asbestos case, to its facts).
78. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). To some extent, the California court
backtracked doctrinally from Brown in Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996).
79. The California Supreme Court extended its rejection of true strict liability beyond
prescription drugs to other products in Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549
(Cal. 1991) (asbestos). But cf Carlin, 920 P.2d 1347 (reaffirming the strict liability label).
80. See Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142-45 (Mont. 1997) (knowledge of danger,
whether or not discoverable, is to be imputed to manufacturer; state-of-the-art evidence is not
admissible to show that manufacturer could not have known of danger). Cf. Potter v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1348-49 (Conn. 1997) (manufacturer's conformance to state of
the art relevant to, but not conclusive on, liability).
81. Even the recent California decision reaffirming the doctrine of "strict" products liability,
Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996), limits liability to risks which are foreseeable.
82. Comment a to section 2 provides in part:
For the liability system to be fair and efficient, most courts agree that the
balancing of risks and benefits injudging product design and marketing must be
done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques
reasonably attainable at the time of distribution .... [M]anufacturers may
persuasively ask to be judged by a normative behavior standard to which it is
reasonably possible for manufacturers to conform. For these reasons, Subsec-
tions (b) and (c) speak of products being defective only when risks were
reasonably foreseeable.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. a; cf id. § 2 cmt. m (text below in note
87). For the propriety of this approach in moral theory, see Moral Foundations, supra note 58, at 465-
67, 483-84, 490-92.
83. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. j. See generally PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at.423-40. In addition to dangers that are obvious, most of the
same limiting principles apply to dangers that generally are known.
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that a product on its face already displays. 4 The proper role of a danger's
obviousness in determining defectiveness in design is far more difficult and subtle.
Although the old no-duty rule for obvious dangers is now properly defunct as an
independent doctrine in the great majority of jurisdictions, courts that test a
product's design defectiveness according to consumer expectations are logically
compelled to shield manufacturers from design liability in cases where the danger
is apparent on the product's face."5 As discussed above, however, most courts now
ascertain a design's defectiveness according to some form of risk-utility balancing
of the costs and benefits of adopting a proposed alternative design. Within this
calculus, obviousness of danger is properly considered to be an important-but not
necessarily decisive-factor in the ultimate balance that determines product
defectiveness. The new Restatement adopts these widely accepted limitations that
courts place on recovery for injuries from dangers that are obvious.86
C. Product Misuse andAlteration
When people choose to use and abuse products in ways that are unforeseeable
and unreasonable, courts generally relieve manufacturers of at least partial
responsibility for resulting harm. 7 Products can hardly be designed to do all things
safely for all people, and so product misuse and alteration provide important
limitations on liability for the sale of defective products. While courts widely hold
that manufacturers have a duty to adopt reasonable precautions against uses,
misuses, and alterations that in fact are reasonably foreseeable, in general there is
no duty to protect against uses and abuses that are not foreseeable. 8 Moreover, the
doctrine of proximate cause may apply to cases of third party misuse, barring
84. "When a risk is obvious or generally known, the prospective addressee of a warning will or
should already know of its existence." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. j.
85. Manufacturers are not liable in such cases because purchasers and users can hardly expect
a product to be free of danger that is apparent for all to see. See, e.g., Vincer v. Ester Williams All-
Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 1975) (young child climbed ladder and fell
into above-ground swimming pool not equipped with simple self-latching gate at top of ladder).
86. For the warnings context, see PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. j,
which provides in part: "In general, a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to warn or
instruct regarding risks and risk avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or generally known
by, foreseeable product users." For the design context, see id. § 2 comment d, which provides in part:
Subsection (b) does not recognize the obviousness of a design-related risk as precluding
a finding of defectiveness. The fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant to the
issue of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a plaintiff from establishing that
a reasonable alternative design should have been adopted that would have reduced or
prevented injury to the plaintiff.
87. "Product sellers . . . are not required to foresee and take precautions against every
conceivable mode of use and abuse to which their products might be put. Increasing the costs of
designing and marketing products in order to avoid the consequences of unreasonable modes of use
is not required." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. m.
88. See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at 471-87.
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liability altogether if the misuse was unforeseeable,89 and principles of comparative
responsibility generally reduce a manufacturer's responsibility proportionate to the
user's own fault for putting a product to an improper type or extent of use.9" The
Products Liability Restatement adopts these widespread views on the role of
product alteration and misuse.91
D. Inherent Product Dangers
A perplexing issue in the law of products liability is whether manufacturers
should be held responsible for injuries resulting from inherent product hazards that
are incapable of being designed or warned away. Many products,. from simple
kitchen knives and matches to complex chemicals and aircraft, may be classified as
possessing such inherent dangers. In most such cases, however, the product's
benefits so clearly outweigh its risks that liability for the product's general inherent
risk is never litigated. Of late, however, courts and commentators are beginning to
reevaluate whether manufacturers of certain unavoidably dangerous products
should be liable for the harm they inevitably cause.' Surely the most notorious
product of this type today is the cigarette, but alcoholic beverages, cheap handguns,
and certain other products all might be viewed as inherently defective because they
arguably cause more social harm than good.
Producers of such generically dangerous products argue that they are merely
providing goods that consumers demand and, accordingly, they should not be held
accountable for harm from danger that is unavoidably part and parcel of the
demanded product design. Some consumer advocates argue to the contrary that,
while products of this type (say, cigarettes or cheap handguns) may be "demanded"
by consumers, such "goods" are inherently bad (defective) if the aggregate social
harm they produce exceeds their aggregate benefit.93 At bottom, this debate
involves fundamental questions of separation of powers between the legislative and
judicial branches of government, for arguably the decision of whether the harm
from cigarettes should be paid for by cigarette manufacturers is properly a
legislative or administrative rather than a judicial decision, if properly a govern-
89. See generally id. at 613-37.
90. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. p.
91. See id. § 2 cmts. m (foreseeability of risk), p (misuse, modification, and alteration); id. § 15
(legal causation); id. § 17 (apportionment of responsibility). Damages apportionment, treated
generally in section 17 as an issue of comparative responsibility, is addressed thoroughly in its own
Restatement which is currently in progress. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: APPORTION-
MENT OF LIABILITY (Council Draft No. 2, 1997).
92. See, e.g., Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993) (5-2) (marshmallow
stuck in young child's throat; summary judgment for supplier reversed and case remanded for trial).
See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 11, at 440-71; Symposium, Generic
Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 3 (1996).
93. See generally Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of
Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1995).
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mental decision at all. Attitudes and the law are presently in substantial flux on
responsibility for cigarette-caused harm,94 but the courts historically have almost
universally shut their doors to claims arising from generic product dangers which
unavoidably inhere in a product's design.9 Yet, this area of products liability law
is in ferment, and it is difficult to predict how courts and legislatures will resolve
this issue in particular contexts in the years ahead. On this intriguing issue, the
Restatement adopts the prevailing view that, except in extreme cases, 96 and putting
aside the special case of cigarettes, the courts have no business legislating the
overall desirability of necessarily dangerous but widely-consumed products.97
VI. CONCLUSION
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability puts a new face on the
law of products liability. But this compendium of legal principles generally only
94. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. (forthcoming Mar. 1998); Tucker S. Player,
Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco
Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311 (1998).
95. In the rare instances where courts have allowed liability in these cases, legislatures
generally have overturned the judicial decisions. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT, supra note
2, § 2 cmt. d Reporters' Note.
96. Extreme cases involve products of "manifestly unreasonable design." PRODucTs LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, 2 cmt. e. Such a product may be ruled defective because "the extremely
high degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social
utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or
to allow children to use, the product." Id.
97. Comment d to section 2 of the Proposed Final Draft provides in part as follows:
Common and widely distributed products such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco,
firearms, and above-ground swimming pools may be found to be defective only
upon proof of the requisite conditions in Subsection (a), (b), or (c). If such
products are defectively manufactured or sold without reasonable'warnings as
to their danger when such warnings are appropriate, or if reasonable alternative
designs could have been adopted, then liability under sections 1 and 2 may
attach. Absent proof of defect under those Sections, however, courts have not
imposed liability for categories of products that are generally available and
widely used and consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm. Instead,
courts have concluded that legislatures and administrative agencies can, more
appropriately than courts, consider the desirability of commercial distribution of
some categories of widely used and consumed, but nevertheless dangerous,
products.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 1, 1997) § 2
cmt. d. Shortly before the ALI voted to approve the Proposed Final Draft at the May 1997 meeting,
a member moved from the floor to strike "tobacco" from inclusion in the comment, and, over the
objections of the Reporters, the membership narrowly voted in favor of tle motion. ALIMembership
Grants Final Approval to Influential Product Liability Treatise, 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 21, at 509 (May 23, 1997). Accordingly, the final Restatement takes no position on whether
sellers should be liable for the inherent dangers in tobacco products.
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"restates" the substance of existing law, so that it truly alters only the face- and not
the body-of most aspects of this area of the law. Yet this Restatement, perhaps
more than others, boldly formulates the liability tests and certain other rules of law
in functional rather than doctrinal form. Restatements of the Law speak with the
considerable authority of the American Law Institute and, over time, they tend to
influence significantly the development of the law, especially in states where the
law is less developed or in flux. Time will tell how willing courts will be to accept
the new Restatement's functionally restated liability standards. There is little doubt,
however, that the Products Liability Restatement will play a significant role in
helping shape the law of products liability for the twenty-first century.
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